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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION--CORINWELL
COMMONWEALTH, ET AL.

v

In discussing the case of Cornwell v Commonwealth,1 the
writer is motivated primarily by a desire to bring this case
to the attention of employers who have elected to accept the
provisions of the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act.
That it can react adversely and, in many cases, unjustly, to the
interests of employers will become apparent to those who
familiarize themselves with the practical application of the
decision.
Secondly, the writer wishes to explain that his position is
that the case is wrong in principle and contrary to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
On August 16, 1943, the appellant, Millard Cornwell, was
injured in the course of his employment with appellee, Department of Highways. Under the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, Chapter 342 Kentucky Revised Statutes, it
was agreed that appellant was to be paid the sum of $15.00
per week, based on an average weekly wage of $25.00 per
week, and that such compensation should be payable from and
including the 16th day of August, 1943, until terminated, m
accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Law of the State of Kentucky The agreement was executed on
a standard form and on the line where length of disability
computed in weeks was to be filled in the words "length of
disability undetermined" were filled in.
This agreement was filed with the Board on August 22,
1944 and received its stamp of approval on August 23, 1944.
Compensation was paid thereunder until January 20, 1945, at
which time the payments were suspended. On October 12,
1946, the appellant, pursuant to the provisions of Kentuckv
Revised Statutes 342.305, filed a petition in the Montgomery
Circuit Court asking for judgment in accordance with terms of
the agreement.
The Department of Highways contended that as it had
ceased voluntary payments, the appellant's recourse was to
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apply to the Board for a hearing, as provided by Kentucky
Revised Statutes 342.270, and as such had not been done within
a period of one year as set out in Kentucky Revised Statutes
342.185, the claim was barred. The circuit court ruled for the
Highway. Department and, upon appeal, the decision was reversed. The effect of the decision was that avy agreement for
compensation when filed with and approved by the Board
became an award.
The Court said that the determination of the question depended upon the construction given Kentucky Revised Statutes
342.270 and Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.305. Kentucky
Revised Statutes 342.270 (1) provides
"(1)

If the parties fail to reach an agreement in

regard to compensation under this chapter, or if they
have previously filed such an agreement with the Board
and compensation has been paid or is due in accordance
therewith and the parties thereafter disagree, either
party may make written application to the Board for a
hearing in-Tegard to -the matter at issue and for a -ruling thereon. Such application for a hearing must be
filed as soon as is practicable after disagreement or
after the cessation of voluntary payments, if any, have
been made."
Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.305 permits any party iU
interest to file, in the circuit court of the county in which the
injury occurred, a certified copy of an agreement approved by
the Board. When tins is done, the court shall render judgment
in accordance therewith.
The Court saad that a careful examination of Kentucky
Revised Statutes 342.270 leads to the conclusion that this section applied to two situations.
First, where the parties have failed to reach an agreement
in regard to compensation, and
Second, where the parties have filed an agreement with the
Board and thereafter disagreed before the agreement has been
approved by the Board. The court was of the opinion that,
when the agreement had been approved by the Board, Kentucky
Revised Statutes 342.305 applied and proceedings to enforce it
nmght be had in circuit court, but, if for any reason, the agreement has not been approved, Kentucky Revised Statutes
342.270 is applicable and a party must first make application to
the Board for a hearing.
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This case is one of first impression m this jurisdiction. In
stating that approval of an agreement gives it the force and
effect of an award, the Court cited Black Mouintamn Corporation
v Middleton2 and Standard Accident Insuranzce Company v
Hinson.3 This proposition does, as a matter of fact, appear m
the cited cases and is applicable to the facts therein which, it is
submitted, are not the same as the Cornwell case, which presents an entirely different problem.
In both the Hlenson case and the Middleton case voluntary
payments had been made for a period and, when they were discontinued, agreements were entered into for stated compensation for stated periods and approved by the Board, after application to the Board for a hearing. Clearly, these cases come
within Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.305.
Before attacking the decision that there was an "award"
in this case, it may be an aid in discussion to consider certain
facts that do not appear in the record. Cornwell was placed on
compensation for full disability immediately after the injury
An open and indefinite agreement as to duration of disability
was filed with the Board and, one day after filing, it received
the clerical stamp of approval. This was routine and that it
received no consideration from the Board is evident from the
dates.
Subsequently Cornwell indicated his desire for a settlement of his claim and, upon examination, his doctor gave him a
rating of 25% permanent partial disability A contract on tins
basis was submitted to Cornwell, who declined to sign it. Compensation payments were discontinued and approximately 21
months later the action was brought in circuit court.
The Department expected Cornwell to file for adjustment
of his claim. When it was not done within a year as provided
by Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.185 it was felt that the claim
was barred.
This decision means that though Cornwell actually has
25% disability or none he will draw 100% disability compensation from the date payments were discontinued until such time
as a motion to reopen is heard and his disability fixed. The Dc243 Ky. 527, 49 S.W (2) 318 (1932).
'251 Ky. 287, 64 S.W. (2) 574 (1933)
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partment has other such cases where payments were discontinued, cases even older than the Cornwell case. The writer
has talked with other employers who have filed these open agreements as required by the Board. Doubtless the effects of the
Cornwell decision will be felt for some time to come.
On the question of award, let us determine just what an
award is. Bouvier 4 defines an award as. "The decision of
arbitrators or referees of a case submitted for arbitration under
agreement of the parties or rule of Court. It must be final and
certan." American Jurisprudence, 5 has this to say of an
award. "An award is the final and binding decree or judgment of arbitrators rendered in their exercise of quasi-judicial
functions to determine the disputed matters referred to them
by the parties in the agreement of submission." It continues,
on page 939 "At common law an award may even be by
parol but in general it is necessary that it be final, certain and
consistent. Webster's New International Dictionary defines the
word as, "To assign or apportion after carefid consideration of
the case."
There was nothing definite or certain in the instant agreement, and approval could not make it so. The payments herein
were undeniably voluntary as provided by Kentucky Revised
Statutes 342.270. This section, as before stated, provides that if
the parties fail to reach an agreement or if they have previously
filed such agreement with the Board and compensation has been
paid and the parties thereafter disagree either party may make
application to the Board for a hearing. Further, application
for hearing must be filed as soon after disagreement or cessation
of voluntary payments as practicable.
This language seems clear and unequivocal to the -writer
that the remedy where voluntary payments have ceased is by
application for hearing and not by action m the circuit court.
The language of the statute makes this so though, the agreement has been filed with the Board and payments made. The
payments under such open agreement are rendered none the less
voluntary by the Board's approval of such action. Is it not natural to assume that payments would not be made if the agreement had the disapproval of the Board9 The Court has read
4 BoUviER, LAW DICTiONARY 302.
'5 Am. JuR. 938.
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something into the act not apparent when it says tins section
applies to agreements fied and disagreement arising before the
Board approves same. This is a weak part of the decision and
puts a premium on fast rubber stamping by the clerk of the
Board. In the Cornwell case, the parties had less than 24 hours
to fill out and file a motion to reopen.
The Court says an award is in the nature of a judgment
and it would be unfaar to compel the injured party to have the
case reopened and prove ins right. Under the Court's decision
just what was awarded-compensation for an indefinite period.
This decision vitiates voluntary payments and puts the burden
on an employer to show right to cease that which he voluntarily
assumed.
The court continues that its decision will not prejudice the
rights of any party, since an aggrieved party may petition to
reopen under Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.125, whereby
compensation previously awarded may be ended, diminished or
increased. This view is fallacious, as the reopening cannot affect compensation paid or to be paid prior thereto.
The Board has always had exclusive jurisdiction as to fact
finding and this decision creates an award without the Board
having considered the facts. It is not a court and has no means
to enforce its actions. It is the contention of the writer that
Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.305 provides a means whereby
the Board's fact findings and awards thereunder may be enforced by the courts.
This section provides that the court's judgment shall have
the same effect as though the claim had been duly heard and
determined by that court. Tins provision, it seems, presupposes
that the facts had been heard by some body, in this instance the
Board.
Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.185 provides that no proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be had
unless claim for compensation shall have been made within one
year from the date of the injury It continues, "If payments
of compensation as such have been made voluntarily, the
making of a claim within such period shall not be required
but shall become requisite following the sitspension of such
voluntary payments.
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The Court in its decision says that to apply Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.270 in such a situation as we have here would
render meaningless the provisions of Kentucky Revised Statutes
342.305. This is not conceded, but the court has not considered
that for all practical purposes its decision renders meaingless
the provision of Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.185, and means
that employers will either cease voluntary payments or not file
preliminary agreements as required by the Board, which has the
right under Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.260 to make rules
and regulations to carry out its purposes.
One of the most important provisions of the act is that for
voluntary payments. Since the inception of the Workmen's
Compensation Act in Kentucky, there has been a practice of the
employers and insurance companies to agree or stipulate with
the employees as to all material facts involved when an employee is injured. The humane purposes of the Workmen's
Compensation Act requires that payments under the said act
be expedited and that payments be made as quickly as possible. The average employee does not save money and it is
therefore necessary when he becomes disabled to start receiving
the benefits of the act at once. The employer then attempts to
give relief within the spirit of the Act by providing instant payments in case of disabling injuries by way of temporary open
agreements. To give such an agreement the status of an award
is contrary to the spirit of the act and puts hobbles on one of its
most important provisions.
Just what does this temporary agreement mean and what
effect is given it by the approval of the Board 9 Such official
sanction means that the Board has determined that the parties
have accepted the provisions of the Ac, that there was a compensable injury, that due and timely notice was given thereof,
that the employee's average weekly earnings entitled him to the
weekly compensation provided therein and that all facts were
as stated in the agreement.
It is submitted that as no extent and duration are mentioned, it is a conditional agreement and would be left open for
further consideration and determination. No other interpretation seems possible of such voluntary payments under an indefinite agreement. No doctor could definitely determine the extent
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of a person's disability and the duration upon examination inmediately after the injury
Consider the hardship on the
employee if the employer waited to enter into an agreement until
the disability was determined. Then and only then is the time
for an "agreement" as to compensation and an award pursuant
to such an agreement.
The reader may or may not agree with the writer's contentions herein. However, it cannot be successfully contended
that the argument against the case is not right m principle and
follows the spirit of the act. That it is correct as a legal tenet
is strongly urged.
In conclusion, it is reiterated that Kentucky Revised Statutes 342.305 is for the sole purpose of enforcing the awards of
the Board where an award in the true sense of the word and
within the meaning of the act has been made. This is true and
necessary for the Board itself has no means of giving force and
effect to is decisions.
J. R. RioARaDsoN
Attorney-at-Law
Lexington, Ky

